Abstract: We test the hypothesis that hedge funds were responsible for the crash in the Asian currencies in late 1997. To do so, we develop estimates of the changing positions of the largest ten currency funds in one currency, the Malaysian ringgit. Our methodology is adapted from the Sharpe's (1992) style analysis approach that decomposes fund returns. We find that the net long or short positions in the ringgit or its correlates fluctuated dramatically over the last four years, however these fluctuations were not associated with moves in the exchange rate. The estimated net position of the major funds was not unusual during the crash period, nor were the profits of the funds during the crisis. In sum, we find no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that George Soros, or any other hedge fund manager was responsible for the crisis.
I. Introduction
Do the positions of major global hedge funds affect fluctuations of exchange rates? More specifically, did George Soros and other large fund operators cause the Asian currency crisis of 1997? We address this question empirically by estimating the dollar exposure of the top ten global hedge funds to Asian currencies before and during the crisis. We test the hypothesis that the dramatic negative returns to these currencies versus the dollar were correlated to large positions, short or long, taken by the funds. The answer is "No."
The problem of estimating the exposure of managers to individual currencies is a difficult one. Unlike mutual funds, for example, hedge funds are not required to disclose their positions in specific securities. Not only are their positions secret, but they can change on a daily, or even an intra-day basis, thus, quarterly information on, say, holdings of dollar/bhat exchange rate contracts by a particular manager at the end of the third quarter of 1997 would likely reveal little about the manager's exposure in the months before or after reporting.
Analysis of the time-series of hedge fund returns is an alternative approach to estimating exposure to various currencies. Sharpe (1992) develops a method for representing a mutual fund manager's "style" as a hypothetical portfolio of passively managed asset classes whose strictly nonnegative portfolio weights may change through time. We alter the Sharpe procedure to fit the particular style of hedge funds. Not only do the managers take negative positions, but they change these positions frequently.
Our methodology also allows us to examine a number of other questions of interest regarding the relation between global hedge funds and the currencies in which they speculate. We find that the positions of the largest funds tend to be correlated, suggestive of herding behavior. Over the
period since 1993, we find periods in which total dollar-valued exposures to certain currencies by the major funds have been on the order hundreds of billions of dollars. Remarkably, currencies during these periods have remained relatively stable. In sum, despite apparently correlated strategies that sometimes increase their combined positions to remarkable levels, global hedge funds apparently do not have the ability to "move" exchange rates. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our econometric methods. In section III we describe the data. In section IV we report the results of our tests. In section five we discuss the implications of our analysis for the potential influence that currency funds may have on the global markets. Section V concludes.
II Methodology

II.1 Econometric Procedure
In the Sharpe (1992) style analysis, the return of any fund i at time t is represented as a linear combination of returns to passively managed asset classes, k:
Where the may estimated by regressions in each period t when the coefficients are constrained kt kt to be constant over mover than k preceding time periods. The beauty of this approach is that the betas can be interpreted as positive portfolio weights on passive indices. Thus, equation 1 may be estimated with a constant, and the constant can be interpreted as excess manager performance, where
the benchmarks are investable indices. The coefficients also provide an estimate of the per-dollar exposure of the fund to a given asset class and the total dollar value exposure of the fund to asset class k at time t may be calculated as E = * Net Asset Value . In our analysis, we are i,t,k kt i,t interested in accurately estimating E for particular currencies. We relax the positivity constraint i,t,k on the coefficients to reflect the fact that hedge funds take both positive and negative positions in currencies and other asset classes. In addition, we relax the first constraint in equation 1, because there is a trade-off between the completeness of the specification of passive indices that "explain" manager performance, and the degrees of freedom in the estimation procedure. The more indices used as regressors, the more time-periods required to hold constant for estimation, and the kt greater the standard error on our coefficient estimates. Thus, we simplify the Sharpe procedure to the estimation of:
In fact, we set k as 1 to examine hypotheses about particular currencies.
This paper is not the first to apply returns-based style analysis to hedge funds. Fung and Hsieh (1997) extend the Sharpe (1992) method to the analysis of hedge funds and commodity trading advisors [CTAs] . They find evidence that hedge funds and CTAs pursue highly dynamic strategies, which is to say that their implicit portfolio weights vary widely through time. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1996) use a returns-based style analysis to separate the offshore hedge fund universe into a set of distinct "styles" characterized by co-movement. Both papers identify a distinctive "Global" style of manager. In the current paper, we focus in depth on this set of global macro 
II.2 Hypothesis Tests
The claims belief that hedge fund operators can "whip" currencies, it is useful to translate such attitudes into a test that can be put to data.
Under the presumption that goal of any currency market manipulation is profit, we can test the hypothesis of currency manipulation by a given fund, or by a group of funds, by regressing the monthly percentage change in the exchange rate, R , on the fund currency exposure E .
Note that this regression has a minor problem. E must be estimated via the rolling regression t,k described in equation (2) which induces an errors in variables problem for individual funds. This may be addressed by forming a portfolio of all the funds before exposure estimation. In addition, with monthly data there are not enough degrees of freedom to estimate a monthly exposure to any given currency. Thus, in practice we are forced to substitute a trailing four-month average of the kt in our calculation of the exposure E . Never the less, if the currency market was being manipulated ikt by hedge funds, we would expect a positive association between exposure and change in the currencies, and thus we would expect to reject the hypothesis that in equation 93) is zero or negative.
III. Data
Hedge fund data return is difficult to obtain because, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are not regulated by the SEC --indeed most of the major funds operate offshore. As a result, they are largely constrained by the SEC from reporting their returns, since publication of performance records can be construed as solicitation of investors and thus would require the funds to conform to a number of SEC regulations that are currently applied to mutual funds and other investment vehicles covered by the Investment Companies Act of 1940. We obtained monthly return information for nine major currency hedge funds over four years from Tass: an advisory service and data vendor. We augmented this data with two additional time series' maintained by Paradigm Asset Management.
The funds were selected because they either identify themselves explicitly as global currency funds, or else they are widely known in the industry as such. billion is a lot of investment capital, it is small in comparison to the daily volume of foreign exchange. The capitalization does not represent an upper bound on the exposure a fund make take with respect to a given currency, however. Hedge funds typically lever their investments. The capitalization represented in Table 1 can be thought of as the size of the margin account used by managers to take positions in a range of different securities. While famous for currency speculation, the managers in Table 1 also take positions in the global debt and equity markets as well. The returns are expressed after fee. Since fees typically range from 15% to 20% of new profits, we can assume that the pre-fee returns were higher for months when the managers did well. This may have some effect on inference, since we might underestimate the exposure of funds to currencies in these months.
IV. Results
IV.1 Did hedge funds cause the Malaysian ringgit crash?
Our first test focuses upon the claim that hedge fund managers caused the Malaysian currency crisis. We estimate equation (2) for each of the hedge funds, using a four-month rolling window for the regression. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the monthly exposures averaged over all ten funds. Since we are using a rolling estimation procedure, we do not expect each observation in the histogram to be independent. Even given the dependence across months, however, it is interesting to note that exposures vary widely both negatively and positively. The regression coefficients suggest that, in effect, there are times when the funds on average are levered eight times in their exposure to the ringgit. An important caveat in this interpretation is that, by using only the ringgit as an explanatory variable, we are assuming that the fund returns are solely explained by the ringgit.
It is likely, however that the ringgit is actually proxying for other Asian currencies in the regression.
Thus, while the coefficients suggest that there were months when the funds were heavily betting for or against the ringgit, they may actually have been invested in another currency --or even in another There are also time when the funds take opposite positions. In early 1995, for example, the Soros funds had negative exposure when the Orbis funds had positive exposure. Figure 3 shows the total dollar-valued exposure of the ten funds along with an index of the value of the ringgit with respect to the dollar over the period. Notice that the aggregate exposure of the funds to the ringgit (or its correlates) varies considerably. In February, 1996, for example, the trailing four-month exposure was a short position in excess of $200 billion. Given this extreme position, it is perhaps extraordinary to note that the ringgit changed less than 1% with respect to the dollar over the four month period ending in February 1996. The figure shows a large positive exposure to the ringgit ending in February, 1997. Again, the net change of the ringgit was close to zero over the preceding four months. Now consider the crucial four month period of June through September of 1997. The ringgit dropped by 10% over this period. The net hedge fun exposure over this four month inteval was close to zero. Negative hedge fund exposures had reached a low of about $100 Billion by the end of June. The hedge funds appeared to be unwinding their negative position in the ringgit and its correlates beginning in June. In fact, the figure suggests they were buying into the ringgit crash from June through August. An interpretation of this activity is that the hedge fund managers --the speculators --were supplying liquidity to a rapidly falling market. It is tempting to suggest that they cushioned the rapid fall of the ringgit, rather than hastened it, however the entire trajectory suggests that the speculators had little ability to affect the exchange rate one way or the other, despite large positions both positive and negative. Table 2 reports the result of the regression testing the manipulation hypothesis about whether hedge fund managers caused the crash of the ringgit. Neither current nor last month's ringgit returns vs. The U.S. dollar are statistically explained by the estimated hedge fund manager positions. There is absolutely no evidence that the ringgit was affected by hedge fund managers.
One objection to the results of this analysis is that we have developed a weak test that failed to reject the manipulation hypothesis due to either its design or lack of data. Perhaps the true positions in the ringgit, for example were much smaller, and were masked by the funds' other activities in other currencies during this period. This is a reasonable alternative explanation of the empirical results. Perhaps the ringgit (or its correlates) was simply not a major factor in the investment policy of the hedge funds. Table 3 reports some evidence on the returns reported by the hedge fund managers over the crash period. The period June through October of 1997 was clearly a volatile period for the managers, and some made extraordinary profits --and extraordinary losses. While the ringgit was only one of many currencies fluctuating in this period, we might expect that, if hedge funds were responsible for its drop, these funds would have profited by their actions. We do not have the figures for the ringgit drop in October yet, but the trend of the other months indicates that the biggest drops were in August and September. Who made money then? Certainly not Soros, who appears to have roughly broken even over the crash period. In fact, in the month of Septmber, when
Mahathir Mahamet wrote his famous editorial accusing Soros of being a highwayman, the Soros funds were mostly down by double digits!
V. Conclusion
Our empirical analysis of the dynamics of hedge funds and the Malaysian ringgit suggest little evidence that hedge fund managers as a group caused the crash. In particular, It is difficult to believe that George Soros was responsible for a "bear raid" on the ringgit when the performance of three of his funds was less than stellar. If anything, it appears that the top ten hedge funds were buying into the ringgit as it fell in the late summer and early fall of 1997. While we have focused our efforts on the Malaysian currency, the issue of the relationship between hedge funds and the world's currencies is an interesting one. Hedge funds operate largely outside of governmental regulations. They are bound by the laws and rules governing the markets in which they operate, but there is no mechanism, other than suspending the convertibility of currency, to control individual positions. In a financial crisis, it is tempting to look for culprits among the most sophisticated of market players, however our evidence suggests that even they bet wrong sometimes. The important issue is whether they profit at the expense of small investors and governmental institutions. If so, then a cost-benefit analysis may be in order. Our study suggests that if anything, the global markets can "absorb" multi-billion dollar positions put on by major currency funds without suffering ill effects. This is an encouraging result and provides the basis for an optimistic outlook of future development of sophisticated instruments and markets. $4,911,928,273 $21,918,252,844 $15,675,280,664 $21,442,320,671 $29,467,860,414 Data source: TASS Advisory Service and Paradigm Asset Management. Capitalization as reported by the funds by month, or interpolated from quarterly data and returns. 
